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Abstract
Since the 1960s, Democrats and Republicans in U.S. Congress have taken increasingly po-
larized positions, while the public’s policy positions have remained centrist and moderate. We
explain this apparent contradiction by developing a dynamical model that predicts ideological
positions of political parties. Our approach tackles the challenge of incorporating bounded ra-
tionality into mathematical models and integrates the empirical finding of satisficing decision
making—voters settle for candidates who are “good enough” when deciding for whom to vote.
We test the model using data from the U.S. Congress over the past 150 years, and find that
our predictions are consistent with the two major political parties’ historical trajectory. In par-
ticular, the model explains how polarization between the Democrats and Republicans since the
1960s could be a consequence of increasing ideological homogeneity within the parties.
1 Introduction
The U.S. Democratic and Republican parties have polarized drastically since the 1960s [2, 22,
23]. Legislators’ ideological positions are distributed bimodally, with an increasingly vast distance
separating the two parties’ modes [4, 17]. Although what it means to be moderate has changed over
the past half century, the general public’s dispersion in ideology remains mostly the same: unimodal,
centrist, and stationary [12, 16, 17]. Figure 1 illustrates contrasting ideological dispersion between
the U.S. public and U.S. Congress. In a system designed to create democratic responsiveness, why
have members of congress of the two major parties shifted while the general public appears to have
remained unchanged?
Political party polarization is a complex social phenomenon. Recent research demonstrates that
many key aspects of social processes can be explained by simple mathematical models. Examples
include opinion dynamics [9], terrorist events [10], the spread of rumors [6], and shifts in religious
affiliation [1]. A number of studies address aspects of voting and elections, such as consensus
formation [27, 28], how opinion clusters form in the compromise process [5], and how democratic
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voting can lead to totalitarianism [14]. Party polarization has now started to gain attention in
the dynamical systems community. A recent study, for example, used a group competition model
and found that the two major parties in the U.S. are increasingly benefiting from polarization in
Congress [20].
In political science, many theoretical models examine how individuals’ voting behavior shapes
political parties’ positions. The classic Downsian model [11] assumes two-party competition in a
one-dimensional ideology space, where citizens cast their vote for the ideologically closest party, and
parties adjust their positions to maximize votes. The Downsian model predicts that both parties
should converge to the median voter’s position. In reality, however, the two major U.S. parties
have dramatically polarized over the past half century.
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Figure 1: Polarization in the U.S. public and Congress (House and Senate combined), as measured
by the standard deviation of ideological positions. The ideological positions are drawn from [17]
for the public and [7] for Congress. Congress’s standard deviation is scaled so that its mean for the
first three data points matches that of the public.
One reason we believe the Downsian model fails empirical validation is the assumption that voters
maximize their utility. Empirical research suggests that voters often behave in ways that are only
boundedly rational [13]. Instead of maximizing, people tend to satisfice; that is, they accept what is
“good enough” and do not obsess over other options [3, 24, 25, 26]. The decisions of a maximizer may
approach those of a satisficer in the presence of noise, misinformation, missing information, decision
fatigue, and other factors that limit one’s ability to choose optimally. Moreover, experimental
evidence demonstrates that for complex decisions, maximizers often make sub-optimal choices [21].
Thus, even if some voters follow a maximizing decision-making strategy, in practice they will often
fail to find the optimum and instead behave similarly to satisficers.
In this article, we (1) develop a simple mathematical model for political party positions, taking the
more realistic satisficing decision making of voters into account; and (2) explain why political party
polarization may develop in the absence of changes in voters’ ideological positions. This work helps
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address the outstanding challenge in political polarization, and social systems more generally [15],
of establishing unified mathematical models that are grounded in empirical findings. In addition to
explaining key aspects of political polarization, our model’s framework provides a foundation for
future studies on other aspects of party dynamics, such as minor party influence and success.
2 Overview
Our modeling framework considers the voter population distributed in a one-dimensional ideology
space, with two parties adjusting their positions along this continuum in order to win the most votes.
Voters decide which party to support based on satisficing—choosing one party randomly out of those
that are satisfactory. The probability that a party is satisfactory to any given voter decays with
the distance between that party and the voter, with the speed of decay determined by a parameter
describing the party’s inclusiveness, or tolerance of ideological diversity. We present a dynamical
model for the parties’ positions in ideology space. We then validate our model’s predictions using
empirical data on the distribution of U.S. legislators’ ideological positions from 1861 to 2015,
from which we estimate the position and inclusiveness of the Democratic and Republican party.
The model employs as an input party inclusiveness, estimated from the data in each Congress,
and predicts the corresponding position of each party over time. We then compare the predicted
positions against historical positions of the two major U.S. parties, to establish a relationship
between party polarization and party inclusiveness. Our model proposes a possible mechanism for
the polarization of political parties without any change in the distribution of the public’s ideological
positions.
3 Deriving the mathematical model
Using congressional roll call voting records, empirical research has found that the U.S. political
division can be well represented by a single dimension [23].1 We refer to this dimension as the
ideology space, with left being liberal and right being conservative. We also describe how liberal or
conservative a party or voter is by their position in the same ideology space, henceforth referred
to as ideological position, or simply as position. Survey data reveals that the American public’s
ideology is distributed in this space in a unimodal manner, peaked at a moderate position and well
approximated by a Gaussian (see the supplementary material, section 1). Thus, we consider the
voters to be distributed in the ideology space according to a Gaussian function ρ(x). Without loss
of generality, we set the mean of the Gaussian to 0, and the standard deviation to σ0. Each party
i adopts a position, denoted as µi, along this ideology space. See Fig. 2 for a sketch of the model
setup.
Consider an election among n parties. We assume the probability that a voter positioned at x is
satisfied with party i decays with the voter’s distance from µi and that this decay is symmetrical.
We refer to this decaying probability as the satisficing function, si(di), where di = |x−µi|. We also
1While a single dimension historically performs well at explaining the vast majority of legislative voting behavior,
there are several notable time periods—such as during the civil rights movement—during which a second dimension
is salient [7].
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Figure 2: Sketch of the model setup showing the interpretation of parameters in the ideology space.
The function ρ (solid curve) represents the opinion distribution in the population of voters. The
parameter µi (triangle) marks the position of one out of possibly n parties competing for voters,
and function si (dashed curve) represents that party’s satisficing function.
assume si(0) = 1 (meaning that a voter perfectly aligned with a party will be satisfied with that
party), and si(di)→ 0 as di →∞. One function that satisfies these properties is, again, a Gaussian:
si(di) = exp[−d2i /(2σ2i )] (here scaled to have unit peak amplitude). The parameter σi represents
how tolerant voters are of parties with ideologies different from their own (Fig. 2). It can also be
interpreted as the inclusiveness of party i; that is, how much a party appeals to voters at distant
ideological positions. Parties with lower inclusiveness are more ideologically homogeneous.
We break down the satisficing decision-making process into explicit statements:
1. Voters who are satisfied with none of the n parties abstain from voting.
2. Voters who are satisfied with a subset M of the n parties vote for each party in M with
probability pi, where
∑
M pi = 1. (Below, we assume for simplicity that pi is the same for all
parties in this set, but this assumption is not essential.)
We first examine the case in which two parties, party 1 and party 2, compete. Since the governing
equations for the two parties are similar, in the following equations, we use index i to denote either
party 1 or 2, and j the other party. The expected share of potential voters at position x who vote
for party i can be expressed as
pi(x|µi, µj) = si(di) (1− sj(dj))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
1
2
si(di)sj(dj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
, (1)
where term A represents the expected share of voters at position x who are satisfied with party i
only, and term B represents half of those who are satisfied with both parties. The expected total
number of voters for party i, which we denote Vi, is obtained by integrating pi(x|µi, µj) over the
ideology space weighted by the population density ρ:
Vi(µi, µj) =
∫ ∞
−∞
ρ(x)pi(x|µi, µj)dx . (2)
To model dynamical changes in positions over time, we assume parties move in the direction that
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Figure 3: (A) A vector field that demonstrates the movement of the two parties at various ideological
positions. Arrows show the direction of the party positions’ movement, with the length of each arrow
proportional to the speed of movement. The parameters used in this figure are the inclusiveness
parameters σ1 = σ2 = 0.5 and time scale constant k = 1. (B) Fixed points for party positions
(µ) as a function of the inclusiveness parameter of the two major parties, assuming symmetrical
inclusiveness σ1 = σ2 = σ. The stable fixed points are shown as solid curves, and the unstable
fixed point is indicated by the dashed line. The shaded area indicates the inclusiveness parameter
region corresponding to that estimated from the DW-NOMINATE data discussed in section 4.3
using methods discussed in section 4.5. (C) Polarization, as measured by the distance between
parties at steady state, as a function of both σ1 and σ2. In all three panels, the parameter σ0 is set
to 0.93, which is the same value used in Fig. 4.
increases the number of votes received at a speed proportional to the potential gain:
dµi
dt
= k
∂Vi
∂µi
, (3)
where k is a positive constant determined from data that sets the time scale. Equation (3) generates
predictions for party i’s position over time, where the left side represents the speed of position
change and the right side represents the change in party’s votes. While we derived this equation
for the two-party case, it admits an immediate extension to the n-party case with the exact same
form, except that the vote, Vi, is then defined relative to all n parties. In supplementary material,
section 4, we explore an alternative model where parties maximize vote share. This model produces
similar outcomes (although it requires additional complexity).
4 Results and comparison with empirical data
4.1 Fixed points of the system
We solve for the fixed points of the system both analytically and numerically with analytical results
presented in section 4.2 and numerical results presented in Figs. 3 and 4. The results reveal that
for sufficiently large inclusiveness parameters, σ1,2, the two parties are attracted to a single stable
5
equilibrium: µ1 = µ2 = 0, at the center of the ideology space. However, for smaller σ1,2, the two
parties stabilize at a finite separation. Fig. 3A visualizes the dynamics of a two-party system by
plotting the derivatives dµ1/dt and dµ2/dt in Eq. (3) as a vector field. In this example, the two
parties stabilize at a finite separation. The fixed points and their stability are shown in Fig. 3B
for the symmetric case, σ1 = σ2. We note that Fig. 3B plots the positions of both parties on the
same vertical axis. In the asymmetric case where σ1 6= σ2, the polarization, as measured by the
distance between the two parties at steady state, is a function of both σ1 and σ2. The numerical
results for this case are shown in Fig. 3C. The system equilibrates at a finite separation in most of
the parameter space.
An intuitive understanding of this result is that when the inclusiveness parameters are large, few
voters abstain. Thus, parties are attracted to the center of the ideology space through the same
mechanism as in the classic Downsian model that predicts the convergence of both parties to
the median voter [11]. However, as the inclusiveness parameters decrease, convergence to the
center increases the number of voters at the tails of the ideology distribution abstaining from
voting. In that case, the parties benefit from moving away from the center, with an equilibrium
distance determined by the parameters. Although the model was presented in a one-dimensional
ideology space, the model’s behavior is similar in two dimensions (see supplementary material
section1).
4.2 Analytical results for two identical parties
The right hand side of the system specified by Eq. (3) can be computed analytically for the sym-
metrical case σ1 = σ2 = σ:
dµi
dt
=
σ0[µi(σ
2 + σ20)− µjσ20]
2σ(σ2 + 2σ20)
3/2
e
− (µ
2
i+µ
2
j )σ
2+(µi−µj)2σ20
2σ2(σ2+2σ20) − µiσ0σe
− µ
2
i
2(σ2+σ20)
(σ2 + σ20)
3/2
. (4)
Solving for the equilibria dµi/dt = 0, and imposing symmetry in party positions µ2 = −µ1 = µ
(this follows from the symmetry in σ1 = σ2), we find
µ
[
−2σ2(σ2 + 2σ20)1/2e
− µ2
2(σ2+σ20) + (σ2 + σ20)
3/2e−
µ2
σ2
]
= 0 . (5)
Clearly µ = 0 is a solution, and thus µ? = 0 is a fixed point of the system for all values of σ and σ0.
Other possible fixed points are given by the solution of the equation (σ2 + σ20)
3/2e−
µ2
σ2 − 2σ2(σ2 +
2σ20)
1/2e
− µ2
2(σ2+σ20) = 0, which can be solved for µ2 explicitly as
(µ?)2 = σ2
(
σ2 + σ20
σ2 + 2σ20
)
ln
[ (
σ2 + σ20
)3
4σ4
(
σ2 + 2σ20
)] ; (6)
the solid line in Fig. 3B is this curve. Note that this expression can be rewritten in terms of
nondimensional parameters {σˆ ≡ σ/σ0, µˆ ≡ µ/σ0} simply by setting σ 7→ σˆ and σ0 7→ 1.
6
The trivial solution µ? = 0 is the only fixed point for σ > σc for some σc, and it is of interest
to understand how σc depends on system parameters
2. This critical value can be understood by
noting that the nontrivial fixed points for µ given in Eq. (6) cease to exist when the logarithm
becomes negative, i.e., when the argument of the logarithm becomes less than one; σc is the critical
value at which the argument is exactly one. Expressing this condition in the nondimensionalized
form gives (
σˆ2c + 1
)3
4σˆ4c (σˆ
2
c + 2)
= 1 , (7)
and rearranging the terms leads to a cubic polynomial in σˆ2c :
3σˆ6c + 5σˆ
4
c − 3σˆ2c − 1 = 0 . (8)
This equation has three real roots for σˆ2c , at σˆ
2
c ≈ {−2.07,−0.247, 0.652}, and only the last root al-
lows for a real-valued solution σˆc ≈ 0.807. The system undergoes a subcritical pitchfork bifurcation
at this point.
The exact shape of the fixed point curve is defined by Eq. (6), which cannot be solved explicitly
for σ (or σˆ in nondimensional form). A convenient approximation can be written by expanding
the right-hand side to the leading order in σˆ, yielding µˆ2 ≈ −σˆ2 ln(√8σˆ2). Define W ≡ −µˆ2/σˆ2,
and rearrange the previous equation to get −√8µˆ2 ≈ W exp(W ). This equation is solved by
W = W (−√8µˆ2), where W is now identified as the special function known as the Lambert W
function. Thus σˆ2 ≈ −µˆ2/W (−√8µˆ2).
The Lambert W function is real-valued for negative arguments only when the argument has mag-
nitude less than 1/e. This sets a bound on the maximum µˆ2 for which a solution exists since√
8µˆ2max ≈ 1/e implies µˆmax ≈ 2−3/4e−1/2 ≈ 0.361. The corresponding value of σˆ is then immediate
since W (−1/e) = −1, yielding σˆmax ≈ µˆmax ≈ 2−3/4e−1/2. These approximations are useful in
understanding the general shape of the bifurcation curve, though the critical points of the exact
expression in Eq. (6) can be easily computed numerically.
4.3 Empirical Data
To examine changes in real-world party positions over time, we employ ideological positions for
Democratic and Republican legislators calculated from their congressional roll call voting records
using the Dynamic, Weighted, Nominal Three-Step Estimation (DW-NOMINATE) method [7].
DW-NOMINATE is a multi-dimensional scaling method that first calculates a pairwise distance
for every two members of the U.S. House of Representatives based on similarities in their roll call
voting records. It then projects the resulting high-dimensional network of representatives to a low
dimension while preserving the pairwise distance relation as much as possible. The representatives’
relative positions in this low-dimensional space are referred to as their ideology scores.3 The same
method can be used for scaling the positions of U.S. Senators, and in what follows we use a
2The result that the trivial solution µ? = 0 is the only fixed point for σ > σc, holds even for two parties with
µ1 6= µ2, as can be seen with a series expansion for large σ retaining only leading order terms.
3Note that this measure is relative in nature—it reflects the similarities and differences among members’ voting
records across a large number of bills, not their positions on any specific issue.
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combined dataset of both representatives and senators (see supplementary material section 2 for
data source).
As an example, Fig. 4A displays a histogram of Democratic and Republican legislators’ ideological
positions during the 2013-15 term, the most recent in the data.
4.4 Model Validation
For purposes of comparing our model with data, we take the mean of each party’s distribution to
represent its position, µi, in the model and the standard deviation of each party’s distribution to
represent its inclusiveness parameter, σi. As members of Congress move farther from the party
mean, we infer that the party is more inclusive—and may thus appeal more to voters farther
away from its center. Repeating that procedure for all available Congresses leads to a series of
party positions over time since 1861, shown as the solid curves in Fig. 4B. We note that two
distinct polarization metrics—the distance between party means (used in Fig. 4) and the standard
deviation of the legislators’ ideology distribution (used in Fig. 1)—consistently demonstrate the
striking increase in party polarization since the 1960s.
Importantly, Fig. 4B also compares the model’s predictions for the two major parties’ positions to
historical data. We set the two parties’ positions in 1861 as their initial conditions and numerically
simulate the dynamical system (3) to predict their positions in subsequent years. In the simulations,
we update the inclusiveness parameter according to the data every Congress, and the model outputs
the positions of both parties according to Eq. (3). Parameters σ0, k, and a proportionality constant
associating the standard deviation in the DW-NOMINATE score with the inclusiveness parameter
are determined from the fit to the data. An animated visualization of Figs. 4A and 4B is included
as a supplementary video.
Our theory shows good agreement with the data (Pearson correlation 0.75; see Figs. 4C and 4D).
Notable deviations are observed around the times of the First and Second World Wars and following
the recent rightward move by the Republican Party, as shown in Fig. 4B.
A central prediction of our model is that lower inclusiveness (more homogeneity within parties) will
lead to higher party polarization. We find support for this prediction in empirical data, as shown in
Fig. 4D. This finding suggests that it is not necessary for the voting population to become polarized
in order for increased political party polarization to occur. Indeed, the electorate need not change
at all; it is held constant in our simulations. We also perform robustness checks using an alternative
measure of party polarization as well as an independent data source for the inclusiveness parameter
and reach the same qualitative conclusions (see supplementary material section 3).
4.5 Parameter fitting
When determining the parameters from the data, we relate the units of the DW-NOMINATE
ideology scores to units for variables in our model by assuming a linear scaling. For example, the
party inclusiveness parameter, σi, is assumed to be linearly related to the DW-NOMINATE data
through the scaling σi = b σdata,i. We fitted the parameters in the model by minimizing the 1-norm
for differences between the time series predicted by the model and the time series from data. Three
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Figure 4: Predictions and validations of the satisficing model. (A) Histogram of ideological positions
for the Democratic and Republican parties in the 2013-15 Congress. (B) Comparison of the model
prediction with time series data for party positions. The solid curves indicate the empirical party
positions, estimated by the mean position of the party’s members of Congress, while the shaded
areas mark the associated standard deviations. The dashed curves show our model predictions. (C)
Comparison of party polarization predicted by our model and polarization observed in the data.
The Pearson correlation between the prediction and the data is 0.75, with p-value 6.1×10−15. The
dashed line corresponds to correlation 1 and is a reference. (D) Party polarization as a function
of σ (average of the Democratic and Republican parties’ inclusiveness parameters). Each marker
represents one Congress term. In both the model’s prediction and the data, party inclusiveness is
negatively associated with polarization. In panels (C) and (D), party polarization is measured as
the distance between party positions.
parameters are fitted: (1) σ0, the standard deviation of the population ideology distribution; (2)
b, the proportionality constant relating the standard deviation in the DW-NOMINATE data with
the party inclusiveness parameter in the model, σi; and (3) k, the time scale constant. We set
the initial conditions for the two parties as given by the data. The best fitting parameters are:
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σ0 = 0.93, b = 3.73, and k = 2.54.
5 Discussion
5.1 Comparison between satisficing and maximizing models
The satisficing assumption is essential to our model’s behavior. Here, we compare the results of our
satisficing model with a maximizing model in the same framework (assuming two parties) and show
that the predictions from the two models are fundamentally different. We consider the maximizing
voters to be defined in the Downsian sense [11]—they maximize their utility function by voting for
the ideologically closest party. With maximizing voters, the number of votes each party receives
is
V
(m)
l =
∫ (µl+µr)/2
−∞
ρ(x)dx, and V (m)r =
∫ ∞
(µl+µr)/2
ρ(x)dx , (9)
where (l, r) = (1, 2) if µ1 < µ2, and (l, r) = (2, 1) if µ1 > µ2. If µ1 = µ2, both parties receive the
same number of votes,
V
(m)
1 = V
(m)
2 =
1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
ρ(x)dx . (10)
We then solve for the fixed points of the system described by Eq. (3) with the two types of vote
calculations and find their stabilities.
Figure 5 shows the stable fixed points for party positions as a function of σ1 = σ2 = σ, for
normalized variables σˆ = σ/σ0 and µˆ = µ/σ0. With satisficing voters, the two parties stabilize at
a finite separation for a range of parameters (as shown above). However, with maximizing voters,
the position (0, 0) is the only stable fixed point, recovering Downs’ result [11], a classic finding in
political science.4 This difference indicates that the voters’ satisficing decision making is indeed a
key ingredient in producing the model’s results.
5.2 Implications
Our model offers new contributions to the literature. First, we present empirical evidence of and an
explanation for the relationship between party homogeneity and polarization, showing that simply
changing the shape of parties’ satisficing functions (via changes to inclusiveness) is sufficient to lead
to divergence in their positions. In particular, even though the impact of intra-party heterogeneity
on a party’s competitiveness has been discussed before [18], the mechanism linking increasing
ideological homogeneity with diverging party positions has remained unclear. Second, the model
also shows why appealing to an extreme segment of the electorate can be a winning political strategy
in times of greater intra-party ideological homogeneity (i.e., decreasing party inclusiveness), which
may be especially relevant for interpreting current trends in U.S. politics. Ideological homogeneity
itself may be driven by other factors, such as partisan redistricting [8] or media echo chambers
4This result can be immediately seen for the symmetric case µ1 = −µ2. In that case, each party is drawn toward
the center to increase votes, despite having split the number of votes equally with the opposing party.
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Figure 5: Stable fixed points for party positions (µˆ) as a function of the inclusiveness parameter of
the two parties (σˆ) for (A) the satisficing model and (B) the maximizing model. For each model,
the positions of both parties are shown on the same vertical axis.
[19], and explicitly modeling how these factors influence intra-party cohesion remains an open area
of research. Third, our approach offers a new quantitative framework that incorporates satisficing
behavior into a voting model.
In addressing the call for combining interdisciplinary methods to study human social behavior [15],
this article offers insight into the complex process of political elections and democratic responsive-
ness through a parsimonious model, and suggests several directions for future work. For example,
do all individuals engage in satisficing, and if so, do they do so in the same way? When and how
can minor parties gain traction? And, how might outcomes change if parties could control both
their position and their level of inclusiveness? For simplicity, we left out a number of electoral
variables, such as party primaries, campaign financing, and Southern realignment, but it will be
important for future research to understand how these factors interact with vote satisficing. We
hope our work will spur further development of quantitative frameworks to incorporate human
bounded rationality into mathematical models.
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1 Additional discussion of model assumptions
We discuss the empirical basis for the assumed ideology distribution of the voting population and
key properties of a higher-dimensional extension of the model.
1
1.1 Population ideology distribution
In the main text, we assumed the public’s ideology distribution to be unimodal and approximated
it as Gaussian. Here we use empirical data to justify this assumption.
The American National Elections Studies (ANES) conducted yearly surveys from 1972 to 2012
asking people’s self-identification on a 7-point scale between extremely liberal and extremely con-
servative. The self identification shows a unimodal distribution centered at “moderate.” The data
were downloaded in November 2015 from http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_
timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf.htm.
The histogram for the U.S. public self-identified ideology is shown in Fig. S1. Here, the distribu-
tion remains peaked at the moderate position for all years, despite fluctuations, and the Gaussian
distribution is a good approximation of this distribution.
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Figure S1: Distribution of self-reported ideology in the ANES data (1972–2012 aggregated) com-
pared with a Gaussian fit. The R2 of the Gaussian fit is 0.74.
1.2 Dimensionality of the ideology space
In the main text, we are motivated by the reality that political idealogy in the U.S. is largely one-
dimensional. The model can be generalized to higher dimensions by replacing the scalar variables
x, µi, and σi with vectors. Figure S2 shows some example trajectories for the two-party case in a
two-dimensional ideology space. In these simulations, for ease of numerical computation, we used
discrete time steps and restricted party movements in each period to either vertical or horizontal
directions, but the steady states reached are equivalent to those found by integrating the differential
equations. The behavior of the system is analogous to that of the one-dimensional problem. For
large values of the parameters σi, both parties converge to the center. For small-to-moderate σi,
however, the parties stabilize at a finite separation on opposite sides of a circle (Fig. S2).
2
Figure S2: Example trajectories of the two-party system in a two-dimensional ideology space, where
ideological positions are denoted by the coordinates (µ1, µ2). Solid circles denote the steady-state
positions of the parties and the colored curves denote transient trajectories from various initial
conditions. Curves of the same color indicate the two parties’ trajectories from one set of initial
conditions. In these simulations, the parameters are set to σ0 = 1 and σ1,2 = 0.2. For simplicity,
the simulation is restricted to parties moving parallel to the horizontal or vertical axis at each time
step. The dashed circle is included to facilitate visualization of the steady-states positions.
2 Data for the U.S. Democratic and Republican party positions
We use congressional voting records compiled with the Dynamic, Weighted, Nominal Three-Step
Estimation (DW-NOMINATE) algorithm to empirically measure the party positions, µ, and the
inclusiveness parameter, σ, for the Democratic and Republican parties. DW-NOMINATE is a
multi-dimensional scaling method that first calculates a pairwise distance for every two members
of Congress based on similarity in their roll call vote records. It then projects the resulting high-
dimensional network of legislators to a low-dimensional space while preserving the pairwise distance
relation as much as possible. The legislators’ relative positions in this low-dimensional space are
referred to as their ideology scores. This procedure was conducted for the House and Senate
separately. The ideology scores of the two chambers were then combined into one dataset, which
is the dataset used in our analyses.
We used the version of the House and Senate combined dataset that was last updated in 2015.
The data was downloaded from https://legacy.voteview.com/dwnomin.htm in May 2016. The
website has since been updated. The new link (as of September 2018) for data download is https:
//voteview.com/data. A copy of the dataset that the authors downloaded in May 2016 and used
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in this analysis can be found as a supplementary data file.
According to Poole and Rosenthal [S1], despite the underlying complexity, the roll call votes in the
House and the Senate can be organized and explained by no more than two dimensions throughout
American history. The first dimension, also called the dominant dimension, is commonly thought of
as tapping into the left-right (or liberal–conservative) spectrum on economic matters. The second
dimension picks up attitudes on cross-cutting and salient issues (e.g., slavery, civil rights, and
social/lifestyle issues).
We use the DW-NOMINATE first dimension score to measure a legislator’s ideological position.
To estimate each party’s position, µi, we use the mean position of a party’s legislators. We also
estimate each party’s inclusiveness parameter, σi, as proportional to the standard deviation of the
legislators’ positions. The second dimension accounts for at most an additional 6%, and at the
lowest point an additional 1%, of explanatory power in legislators’ votes [S1].
3 Robustness checks
In this section, we provide evidence that the core conclusions of our paper do not change when
using alternative datasets and slightly different model assumptions.
3.1 Validation for the satisficing function from independent data
For a robustness check of our findings, we employed an alternative estimate of the satisficing
function parameter σ using a dataset that is independent of the DW-NOMINATE scores shown in
the main text.
The data used is the American National Elections Studies (ANES) 1948-2012 time series dataset,
as described in section 1 above. We used three variables from the survey: the self-reported liberal-
conservative scale (VCF0803), the feeling thermometer for liberals (VCF0211), and the feeling
thermometer for conservatives (VCF0212). Data on these variables are available for 18 years
between 1972 and 2012, for 55,674 individuals in total.
The feeling thermometer questions ask participants to report their feeling towards a group on a
0-100 scale. Participants are told that 50–100 means they feel favorably towards the group, 0–50
means they do not feel favorably towards the group, and 50 means they do not feel particularly
warm or cold.
We assume that thermometer ≥ 50 means satisfied with the liberal/conservative position. The self-
reported liberal-conservative scale is 1 to 7, where 1 represents most liberal, and 7 most conservative.
Fig. S1 shows the aggregated distribution of the data from 1972 to 2012. Given the definition of
the 7-point scale, we interpret the target group (liberal and conservative) as positioned at 1 and 7
of this scale, respectively. Then, we calculate the proportion of the population satisfied with the
target group as a function of their distance to the group. We fit a Gaussian to this curve and get
the parameter σ from the fit, which corresponds to the width of the satisficing function. Fig. S3
4
shows, as an example, the behavior of the data in 2012. The two satisficing curves for conservatives
and liberals collapse, and are well approximated by a Gaussian function.
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Figure S3: ANES thermometer data from 2012. We assume that thermometer ≥ 50 means satisfied.
(A) Proportion of the population satisfied with liberals and conservatives by their ideological posi-
tion, where 1 means extremely liberal and 7 means extremely conservative (B) Proportion satisfied
as a function of the distance to the target groups (liberals or conservatives), and Gaussian fit. The
two curves collapse and can be approximated by a Gaussian function. The best fitting Gaussian
has a standard deviation of 3.3.
We repeat the analysis for all 18 years of data available. Fig. S4 plots the best fitting σ value to the
ANES data of each year (horizontal axis) against the σ value estimated from the DW-NOMINATE
data of the Congress that includes the same year. The Pearson correlation is 0.51 (p = 0.03). The
σ value estimated from ANES correlates with distance between parties (i.e., party polarization) in
the DW-NOMINATE data (Congress data) with Pearson correlation −0.58 (p = 0.01).
This analysis serves as a robustness check for the negative relationship between party separation
(i.e., political polarization) and the narrowing of the satisficing function (i.e., increasing intra-party
ideological homogeneity or reducing inclusiveness).
3.2 Polarization in alternative metrics of party position
The DW-
NOMINATE score has been criticized at times for its computational complexity and for the difficulty
of interpreting its axes. Here, we present a simpler and easier-to-understand metric and show that
a negative relationship between polarization and inclusiveness is still observed.
We use data from the U.S. House of Representatives’ roll call records for the period 1941–2015.
The data were downloaded from https://www.govtrack.us/data/ in March 2016.
We calculate two scores for each representative. For each representative in each Congress, we
calculate a Republican alignment score (SR). This score measures the proportion of times she or
he voted in agreement with the Republican majority position. For example, if 60% of Republican
5
Figure S4: Comparing σ fitted from the ANES data and metrics computed from the DW-
NOMINATE data. Left: the σ parameters inferred from the two sources are positively correlated,
giving us some confidence in using the DW-NOMINATE standard deviation to approximate the
“tolerance” of voters. Right: the parameter σ fitted from the ANES data is negatively correlated
with the distance between parties (i.e., party polarization), which supports the observation made
in the main text using σ derived from the DW-NOMINATE data.
representatives supported a bill, then a representative voting in favor of that bill would be counted
as voting in agreement with the Republican majority. More explicitly,
SR =
NR
N
, (S1)
where SR is the Republican alignment score, NR is the number of times voting with the Republican
majority, and N is the total number of votes. Similarly, we also calculate a Democratic alignment
score for each representative,
SD =
ND
N
, (S2)
where ND is the number of times a representative votes with the Democratic majority.
Finally, we combine the two scores into one alternative metric:
S =
1
2
(SR − SD). (S3)
Results of this analysis are shown in Fig. S5. The polarization trend is observable even using this
simple metric (shown in the second column of Fig. S5). The negative relationship between the
interparty distance (i.e., party polarization) and party inclusiveness is still present. The Pearson
correlation in the DW-NOMINATE data is −0.77 (p = 2 × 10−16), and the Pearson correlation
in the alternative metric is −0.59 (p = 2 × 10−8). Note that the Republican and Democratic
scores (shown in the third and fourth columns of Fig. S5) exhibit asymmetry due to a number of
unanimous votes.
6
Figure S5: Party polarization trends from alternative metrics. Top row: time history of party
positions and standard deviations measured by the various metrics. Bottom row: distance between
parties (i.e., party polarization) vs. party inclusiveness based on various metrics. (A, B) DW-
NOMINATE data (same as used in Fig. 4 of the main text). (C, D) Alternative metric S. (E, F)
Republican alignment score SR. (G, H) Democratic alignment score SD.
4 Alternative model that maximizes vote share
In Eq. (3.3) of the main text, we assume that each party acts to maximize its number of votes. But
in many cases parties may seek instead to maximize their vote share. We analyze this alternative
model and find that similar qualitative conclusions hold; specifically, lower inclusiveness is related
to greater party polarization. In the main text we chose to present the vote-maximizing model
because it requires fewer assumptions and parameters.
In the alternative model for elections among parties 1 through n, Equation (3.3) is modified to
dµi
dt
= k
∂
∂µi
(
Vi∑n
j=1 Vj
)
, (S4)
where n is the number of parties. Similar expressions for p can be derived for multi-party systems.
For example, in a three-party system,
p1 = s1(1− s2)(1− s3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 1
+
1
2
(s1s2(1− s3) + s1s3(1− s2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 2
+
1
3
s1s2s3︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 3
, (S5)
7
where the functions s1, s2, and s3 are the same satisficing functions as described in the main
text. Term 1 gives the expected proportion of voters satisfied with party 1 only. Term 2 gives the
proportion satisfied with party 1 and exactly one other party. Term 3 gives the proportion satisfied
with all three parties.
In the case where exactly two parties compete, Eq. (S4) predicts that both parties will converge
to the median voter’s position, recovering a classic result in political science [S4]. However, this
strategy is sensitive to the presence of even very small third parties. In the multi-party version of
Eq. (3.3), with a minor third party (characterized by a small σ3 parameter), the outcome changes:
the two major parties diverge from the median and stabilize at a finite distance from each other.
Intuitively, because voters who are unsatisfied with either party choose to abstain, in a strictly two-
party system, the median voter’s position does not maximize the number of votes for either party,
although it does maximize the vote share. It is only with the threat of additional parties capturing
lost votes that convergence to the median ceases to be optimal. This prediction is in agreement
with previous research that finds that third-party candidates can shape election outcomes [S3].
We also perform analyses similar to those shown in Fig. 4 using a four-party version of Eq. (3.3),
consisting of two major parties and two minor parties, and find qualitatively similar results (an
example is shown in Fig. S6).
Figure S6: The comparison of party position over time predicted by the alternative model for
maximizing vote share with empirical data. In the alternative model, we assume two major parties
(shown), and two minor parties on either side of the major parties (not shown).
8
References
[S1] K.T. Poole, H.L. Rosenthal, Ideology and Congress (Transaction Publishers, 2011).
[S2] H. Hermsen, A. Verbeek, Equilibria in multi-party systems, Public Choice, 73, 147 (1992).
[S3] Lee, D. J. Anticipating entry: Major party positioning and third party threat, Polit. Res.
Quart., 65, 138–150 (2012).
[S4] Downs, A. An economic theory of political action in a democracy, J. Polit. Econ., 65 (1957),
pp. 135–150.
9
